QUESTION

A quick question regarding keri’ah (tearing clothing in mourning) at the moment of death, specifically for a person who is not one’s immediate relative. I should mention that this may be a practical question for me in the near term.

Min ha-din (according to the strict law), one is obligated in keri’ah in this situation (Moed Katan 25a; Yoreh De’ah 340). However, the custom developed not to tear, out of concern that people would be unwilling to remain with a dying person at the moment of death if doing so would obligate them to tear their clothing. As the Zechor LeAvraham (3:21) puts it, regarding why we don’t tear  for every talmid chacham: “…if one were to tear for each of them, we would have no garment left on a cold day, we would have no garment left on a cold day.”

Now that most people are less protective of their clothing, is there a reason to return to the original law required by Chazal?

ANSWER

Yes, if one is present at the moment of death and is not a doctor, nurse, paramedic, or other professional regularly exposed to this reality, then one should tear keri’ah.

Although what you describe is indeed the common practice, Rav Moshe Feinstein opposed it. He writes that even doctors must tear when they are present at the moment of yitziat neshamah (the soul’s departure), Igrot Moshe, Choshen Mishpat 2:73:10:

וראיתי בספר גשר החיים מהגרי”מ זצ”ל טוקצינסקי פי”ד סעיף ט’ שהביא בשם ס’ שלחן גבוה שנהגו להקל ולא לקרוע שאל”כ לא ימצאון אינשי שירצו לבא לעמוד בשעת יציאת נשמה, והוא טעם קלוש לבטל חיוב ממש שמפורש בברייתא במו”ק דף כ”ה ע”א רשב”א אומר העומד על המת בשעת יציאת נשמה חייב לקרוע ובשבת דף ק”ה ע”ב נחשב בשביל זה שהוא מתקן בהקריעה לחייבו חטאת בשבת משום קורע, ואם לא היה חיוב ממש שבשביל חשש קטן דאינשי דלא מעלי או אינשי עניי לא ירצו לבא לעמוד בשעת יציאת נשמה דבר שחז”ל לא חששו לזה אף שהם חששו ביותר להפסד ממון דאינשי, והוא רק טעם על מה שלא מיחו באלו שאין קורעין אבל לא טעם על מה שאינשי מעלי ינהגו כך ולכן ודאי צריך לקרוע כדינא.

I saw in the book Gesher HaChaim (14:9) by Rav Yechiel Michel Tukachinsky, that he cites the Shulchan Gavoah as saying that the custom developed to be lenient and not to tear. The reason given is that, otherwise, people would not be found who would be willing to come and stand with a person at the moment of yitziat neshamah.

But this is a weak reason to nullify an actual obligation that is stated explicitly in the baraita in Moed Katan 25a: “Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: One who stands over the deceased at the moment of yitziat neshamah is obligated to tear.” And in Shabbat 105b, this tearing is considered a constructive act, such that one who does it on Shabbat is liable for a sin-offering because of the prohibition of tearing.

If this were not a real obligation, then because of a small concern that improper people, or poor people, would not want to come and stand at the moment of yitziat neshamah, Chazal would not have imposed it. Chazal were certainly very concerned about people’s financial losses, and yet they did not raise this concern here.

Rather, this reason can only explain why people did not protest against those who failed to tear. It is not a reason for upright people to conduct themselves this way. Therefore, one certainly must tear according to the law.

Rav Moshe’s argument is very strong. The obligation is stated explicitly in the Gemara, and he does not think that the concern that people might avoid being present at the moment of death is strong enough to uproot a clear halakhic obligation. At most, he suggests, that concern may explain why people did not protest against those who failed to tear. It does not justify the practice for those who are careful about halakhah.

That being said, I think there is room to distinguish between ordinary people and medical professionals.

For doctors, nurses, paramedics, and others who are regularly present at death, it seems unrealistic to expect them to tear every time they are present at the moment of yitziat neshamah. The reasons given by other poskim, including the idea that the goses (dying person) implicitly forgoes this honor so that he or she can receive full and undistracted care, are compelling in this context. There is also something like an ein gozrin gezeirah ela im kein hatzibbur yekholin la’amod bah (we do not impose a decree unless the community can realistically uphold it) consideration here, even though this is not technically a rabbinic decree.

It is also worth noting that in the time of Chazal, there were no intensive care units or hospital settings in which certain professionals dealt with death on a regular basis. That reality matters.

At the same time, one could argue that specifically doctors and nurses need practices that preserve sensitivity to the profundity of death. Regular exposure to death can have a real desensitizing effect. If you have seen The Pitt, one of its most moving parts is the way Dr. Robby gathers the doctors and nurses when someone dies, so that a life does not depart from this world without people stopping to take stock of who that person was and what they meant to those connected to them.

So perhaps the first thing to reinstitute, even if not keri’ah itself, is the practice some had of opening a shirt button and leaving it unbuttoned for the rest of the day. Certainly, the blessing of Dayan HaEmet should be recited. Of course, if a doctor, nurse, paramedic, or other professional is wearing a uniform that belongs to the hospital or institution, and not to them personally, then they would be exempt from tearing that garment.

For someone who is not a doctor, nurse, paramedic, or someone otherwise regularly exposed to death, I would certainly be in favor of returning to the ikkar ha-din (basic law) and tearing keri’ah, as Rav Moshe writes. This is not only because there is a real chiyuv (obligation), and because the justifications for an ordinary person not tearing are weak. It is also because, on a human and spiritual level, how can we witness a person die and not give expression to the tragedy, to the rip that has just been created in the world?

Not tearing, especially when the Gemara says that one must, can register to others and even to ourselves as a kind of indifference to what has just occurred, even if technical halakhic arguments can be made to justify the common practice.